Balancing New Against Old Information: The Role of Surprise in Learning by Faraji, Mohammadjavad et al.
1Balancing New Against Old Information: The
Role of Surprise in Learning
Mohammadjavad Faraji 1, Kerstin Preuschoff 2, †, and Wulfram Ger-
stner 1, †, ∗
1School of Computer and Communication Sciences and School of Life Sciences, Brain
Mind Institute, E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´ral de Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne EPFL, Switzer-
land.
2Geneva Finance Research Institute and Center for Affective Sciences, University of
Geneva, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.
† Co-senior author
∗ Corresponding author: wulfram.gerstner@epfl.ch
Keywords: Bayesian Inference, Learning, Surprise, Neuromodulation
Abstract
Surprise describes a range of phenomena from unexpected events to behavioral re-
sponses. We propose a measure of surprise and use it for surprise-driven learning. Our
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surprise measure takes into account data likelihood as well as the degree of commitment
to a belief via the entropy of the belief distribution. We find that surprise-minimizing
learning dynamically adjusts the balance between new and old information without the
need of knowledge about the temporal statistics of the environment. We apply our
framework to a dynamic decision-making task and a maze exploration task. Our sur-
prise minimizing framework is suitable for learning in complex environments, even if
the environment undergoes gradual or sudden changes and could eventually provide a
framework to study the behavior of humans and animals encountering surprising events.
1 Introduction
To guide their behavior, humans and animals rely on previously learned knowledge
about the world. Since the world is complex and models of the world are never perfect,
the question arises whether we should trust our internal world model that we have built
from past data or whether we should readjust it when we receive a new data sample. In
noisy environments, a single data sample may not be reliable and in general we need
to average over several data samples. However, when a structural change occurs in the
environment, the most recent data samples are the most informative ones and we should
put more weight on recent data samples than on earlier ones.
Indeed, both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old
and newly acquired data during learning (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2012;
Krugel et al., 2009; Pearce and Hall, 1980) and rapidly adapt to changing environ-
ments (Pearce and Hall, 1980; Wilson et al., 1992; Holland, 1997). To capture this be-
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haviour, existing models detect and respond to sudden changes using (absolute) reward
prediction errors (Hayden et al., 2011; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Roesch et al., 2012), risk
prediction errors (Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007; Preuschoff et al., 2008), uncertainty-
based jump detection (Nassar et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts, 2011) and
hierarchical modeling (Behrens et al., 2007; Adams and MacKay, 2007). Typically, in
the above models, a low-dimensional variable, linked to the characteristics of the spe-
cific experimental design, is used to trigger a rebalancing between new and old infor-
mation. Here we aim to generalize these approaches by using a more generic ‘surprise’
signal as a trigger for shifting the balance between old and new information.
Quantities related to surprise have been previously used in psychological theories
of attention (Itti and Baldi, 2009), in statistical models of information theory (Shannon,
1948) and in machine learning (Sun et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2013; Little and Sommer,
2014; Schmidhuber, 2010; Singh et al., 2004). For example, in artificial models of cu-
riosity, surprise is linked to sudden increases in information compression (Schmidhuber,
2010). Planning to be surprised so as to maximize information gain has been suggested
as an optimal exploration technique in dynamic environments (Sun et al., 2011; Lit-
tle and Sommer, 2014). Maximizing an internally generated surprise signal can drive
active exploration for learning unknown environments, in the absence of external re-
ward (Frank et al., 2013). In the framework of intrinsically motivated reinforcement
learning (Singh et al., 2004; Oudeyer et al., 2007), researchers have defined ad-hoc fea-
tures (Singh et al., 2004; Sutton et al., 2011; Silver et al., 2016) or information theoretic
quantities (Mohamed and Rezende, 2015) that could replace the reward-prediction-error
of classical reinforcement learning by a generalized model prediction error which could
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be surprise-related. Furthermore, in the context of variational learning and free-energy
minimization, a surprise measure has been defined via the model prediction error (Fris-
ton, 2010; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Rezende and Gerstner, 2014; Brea et al., 2013).
Mathematically, human surprise is difficult to quantify (Baldi and Itti, 2010; Itti
and Baldi, 2009; Palm, 2012; Tribus, 1961; Shannon, 1948). Existing concepts can
be roughly classified into two different categories. First, the log-likelihood of a single
data point given a statistical model of the world has been called Shannon surprise or
information content (Shannon, 1948; Tribus, 1961; Palm, 2012). Thus, in the context
of these theories an unlikely event becomes a surprising event. Information bottleneck
approaches (Tishby et al., 2000; Mohamed and Rezende, 2015) fall roughly into the
same class. Second, in the context of Baysian models of attention, surprise has been
defined via the changes in model parameters induced by a new data point (Itti and
Baldi, 2009; Baldi and Itti, 2010). Thus, in these theories an event that causes a big
change in the model of the world becomes a surprising event. Surprise as successful
algorithmic compression of the agent’s world model (Schmidhuber, 2010) is a non-
Baysian formulation of a related idea. But what do we mean by (human) surprise?
The Webster dictionary defines surprise as “an unexpected event, piece of infor-
mation” or “the feeling caused by something that is unexpected or unusual” [merriam-
webster.com]. Note that ‘unexpected’ is different from ‘unlikely’. An event can be
unlikely without being unexpected: for example, you may park your car at the shop-
ping mall next to a green BMW X3 with a license plate containing the number 5 without
being surprised, even though the specific event is objectively very unlikely. But since
you did not have any expectation, this specific event was not unexpected. A pure like-
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lihood based definition of surprise, such as the Shannon information content (Shannon,
1948; Tribus, 1961) cannot capture this aspect. Note that something can be unexpected
only if the subject is committed to a belief about what to expect. As Matthew M. Hur-
ley, Daniel C. Dennett and Reginald B. Adams have put it: “ what surprises us is ...
things we expected not to happen – because we expected something else to happen in-
stead. ” (Hurley et al., 2011). In other words, surprise arises from a mismatch between
a strong opinion and a novel event, but this notion needs a more precise mathematical
formulation.
In practice, humans know when they are surprised (egocentric view) indicating that
there are specific physiological brain states corresponding to surprise. Indeed, the state
of surprise in other humans (observer view) is detectable as startle responses (Kalat,
2012) manifesting itself in pupil dilation (Hess and Polt, 1960; Preuschoff et al., 2011)
and tension in the muscles (Kalat, 2012). Neurally, the P300 component of the event-
related potential (Pineda et al., 1997; Missonnier et al., 1999) measured by electroen-
cephalography is associated with the violation of expectation (Jaskowski et al., 1994;
Kolossa et al., 2015). Furthermore, surprising events have been shown to influence the
development of the sensory cortex (Fairhall et al., 2001), and to drive attention (Itti and
Baldi, 2009), as well as learning and memory formation (Ranganath and Rainer, 2003;
Hasselmo, 1999; Wallenstein et al., 1998).
As the first aim of this paper, we would like to develop a theory of surprise that
captures the notion of unexpectedness in the sense of a mismatch between our current
world model and the world model that the new data point implies. As a second aim
of the paper we want to study how surprise can influence learning. We derive a class
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of learning rules that minimize the surprise if the same data point appears a second
time. We will demonstrate in two examples why surprising events increase the speed
of learning and show that surprise can be used as a trigger to balance new information
against old one.
2 Results
In the first subsection we introduce our notion of surprise and apply it to a few examples.
In the second subsection we derive a learning rule from the principle of surprise mini-
mization. The subsequent subsections apply this learning rule to two scenarios, starting
with a one-dimensional prediction task, followed by a maze exploration corresponding
to a parameter space with more than two hundred dimensions
2.1 Definition of Surprise
We aim for a measure of surprise which captures the notion of a mismatch between an
opinion (current world model) and a novel event (data point) and which should have the
following properties.
(i) surprise is different from statistical likelihood because it depends on the agent’s
commitment to her belief.
(ii) with the same level of commitment to a belief, surprise decreases with the like-
lihood of an event.
(iii) for an event with a small likelihood, surprise increases with commitment to the
belief.
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(iv) A surprising event will influence learning
While the final point will be the topic of the next subsection, we will present now
a definition of surprise and check the properties (i) to (iii) by way of a few illustrative
examples.
To mathematically formulate surprise, we assume that a subject receives data sam-
ples X from an environment that is complex, potentially high-dimensional, only par-
tially observable, stochastic, or changing over time. In contrast to an engineered en-
vironment where we might know the overall lay-out of the world (e.g., a hierarchical
Markov decision process) and learn the unknown parameters from data, we do not want
to assume that we have knowledge about the lay-out of the world. Our world model
may therefore be conceptually insufficient to capture the intrinsic structure of the world
and would therefore occasionally make wrong predictions even when we have observed
large amounts of data. In short, our model of the world is expected to be simplistic and
wrong - but since we know this we should be ready to readapt the world model when
necessary.
In our framework, we construct the world model from many instances of simple
models, each one characterized by a parameter θ ∈ RN . The likelihood of a data
point X under model θ is p(X|θ). In a neuronal implementation, we may imagine that
different instantiations of the model (with different parameter values θ) are represented
in parallel by different (potentially overlapping) neuronal networks in the brain. If a
new data point X is provided as input to the sensory layer, the different models respond
with activity pˆX(θ) = c p(X|θ) with a suitable constant c (which may depend on X but
is the same for all models). The distribution pˆX(θ) represents the naive response of the
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whole brain network (i.e., of all models) in a setting where all the models are equally
likely. Formally, pˆX(θ) is the posterior probability under a flat prior (see Mathematical
Methods). We refer to pˆX(θ) as the “scaled data likelihood” of a naive observer.
However, not all models are equally likely. Based on the past observation of n data
points, the subject has formed an opinion which assigns to each model θ its relevance
pin(θ) for explaining the world. In a Bayesian framework, we could describe the likeli-
hood of the new data point X under the current opinion by p(X) =
∫
θ
p(X|θ)pin(θ)dθ
where pin(θ) summarizes the current opinion of the subject and the integral runs over all
possible model instantiations, be it a finite number or a continuum. In case of a finite
number θk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we can also think of p(X) as the data likelihood in a mixture
model with basis functions p(X|θk). However, since we are interested in surprise, we
are not interested in the data likelihood but rather in the degree of commitment of the
subject to a specific opinion. The commitment is defined as the negative entropy of the
current opinion:
commitment = −H(pin) =
∫
θ
pin(θ) lnpin(θ)dθ. (1)
A subject with a high commitment to her opinion (low entropy) will be viewed as a
confident subject.
Surprise is the mismatch of a perceived data point Xn+1 with the current opinion.
The current opinion (after observation of n data samples X1, . . . , Xn) is characterized
by the distribution pin(θ). The observed data point X = Xn+1 would lead in a naive
observer to the scaled likelihood pˆX(θ) introduced above. We define the surprise as the
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Kullback-Leibler divergence between these two distributions
Scc(X; pin) = DKL[pin(θ)||pˆX(θ)] =
∫
θ
pin(θ) ln
pin(θ)
pˆX(θ)
dθ. (2)
We call Scc a confidence corrected surprise because its definition includes the com-
mitment to an opinion. To get acquainted with this definition, let us look at a few
examples.
First, imagine that three colleagues (A, B, and C) wait for the outcome of the selec-
tion of the next CEO. Four candidates are in the running. Suppose that we have four
models, θ1, ..., θ4 where model θk means candidate X = k wins with probability (1− )
(with small ) and the remaining probability is equally distributed amongst the other
candidates. Formally, the model (or basis function) with parameter θk predicts outcome
probabilities p(X = k|θk) = 1− , and p(X = k′|θk) = /3 for k′ 6= k (Fig. 1A, right).
The current opinion {piA(θ), piB(θ), piC(θ)} of each colleague about the four possi-
ble models corresponds to the histogram in Fig. 1A, left. Colleague A who is usually
well informed has a weighting factor piA(θ1) = 0.75 for the first model, because he
thinks the first candidate to be likely to win. According to his opinion, the first candi-
date wins with probability pA(X = 1) =
∑
k p(X = 1|θk)piA(θk) and he gives lower
probabilities to the other candidates (Fig. 1A, table). Colleague B has heard rumors and
favors the third candidate while colleague C is uninformed as well as uninterested in the
outcome and gives the same probabilities to each candidate. Note that colleagues A and
B have the same commitment to their belief, i.e. H(piA) = H(piB), but the likelihood
of candidates differs. The commitment of colleague C is lower than that of A or B.
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Evaluation of the surprise measure indicates that (see Mathematical Methods for
the exact calculations)
(a) if candidate 1 is selected, then A and B - despite having the same overall com-
mitment to their belief - will be differently surprised due to different likelihoods of
candidate 1 in their models.
(b) if candidate 2 is selected, then A is more surprised than if candidate 1 is selected
because in his model candidate 2 is less likely.
(c) if candidate 2 is selected then A will be more surprised than C. Even though both
colleagues assigned the same likelihood for this candidate, A’s level of commitment to
his belief is larger which leads to a bigger surprise.
Second, let us look at the theory of jokes developed by philosophers and cognitive
psychologists (Hurley et al., 2011) which emphasize that surprise in a joke can only
work if the listener is committed to an opinion. Here is an example joke: “There are two
goldfish in a tank. One turns to the other and says: You man the guns, I’ll drive”. The
reason that some people find the joke funny is that “a perception of the world (manning
the guns and driving the tank) suddenly corrects our mistaken preconception (tank as
a liquid container)” (Hurley et al., 2011). Let us analyze the joke in the framework
of our surprise measure. A naive English speaking adult knows that tank can have
two meanings, liquid container or military vehicle (Fig. 1B, top). In the context of
our theory, the two meanings correspond to two models (parameters θ1 and θ2 which
have equal prior probability (opinion pi0). In the first sentence of the joke, the word
goldfish (data point X1) shifts the belief of the listener to a situation where he gives
more weight to the liquid container. This becomes the opinion pi1 of the listener (Fig.
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1B, middle). The opinion pi1 has low entropy, indicating a strong commitment. Now
comes the second sentence, with the words ‘driving’ and ‘guns’ which we may consider
as data point X2. These words trigger in a naive English speaking adult a distribution
pˆX2(θ) (Fig. 1B, bottom) which favors the interpretation of tank as a military vehicle.
Since the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions in the second and third
line is big, the listener is surprised.
Third, let us return to the example of the green BMW X3 with a 5 in the license
plate, mentioned in the introduction. The likelihood of finding this type of car next to
you in a shopping mall parking lot is extremely low (Fig. 1C) yet you are not surprised.
If it were the parking lot of a company where every morning you see a little red car on
this very same parking slot, but today you see a green BMW you might be surprised -
quite independent of the details of the green car. The difference arises from the degree
of commitment.
The observations made in the above examples can be mathematically formalized as
follows.
(1) Our measure of surprise as defined in Eq. (2) is a linear combination of Shannon
surprise and Bayesian surprise (and two further terms). Because it contains Shannon
surprise as one of the terms, surprise decreases with increasing likelihood of the data
under the current model (see Mathematical Methods). This formal statement answers
points (i) and (ii) from the beginning of the subsection.
(2) Our measure of surprise as defined in Eq. (2) accounts for the differences in sur-
prise between two subjects that reflect the differences in commitment to their opinion.
In particular, a less-confident individual (lower commitment to the current opinion) will
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Figure 1: Examples of surprise. A. A committed person is more surprised than an
uncommitted one. Three colleagues A, B and C have different believes (left) about the
models θ1, ..., θ4 that determine the likelihood (right) that one of the four candidates is
chosen as the CEO. Colleague A puts a lot of weight on the first model indicating his
preference for the first candidate (top left). The table (bottom) indicates the likelihood
of each candidate (columns) being chosen as the CEO (after marginalization over all
models) for each colleague (rows). If the candidate number 2 is selected (column high-
lighted by red color), subject C is less surprised than subjects A and B because C is not
committed to a specific opinion, although the likelihood of candidate 2 being chosen is
considered the same (0.25) for all three colleagues. B. Surprise occurs only if a com-
mitted belief is disturbed. The first phrase of the goldfish-joke transforms our belief
about the meaning (θ) of “tank” from pi0(θ) (top) to pi1(θ) (middle). The second phrase
then causes in a naive observer a distribution pˆX2(θ) (bottom) that is very different from
the last belief pi1(θ) (middle); thus the listener is surprised. C. For a driver who just
cares about having a free park slot, finding a park slot (empty red rectangle) next to a
BMW X3 with the number plate 7259 (blue cross sign) is not very surprising, although
it is very unlikely to occur.
generally be less surprised than a confident individual who is strongly committed to her
opinion (see Mathematical Methods). This formal statement answers point (iii) from
the beginning of the subsection.
(3) Our measure of surprise as defined in Eq. (2) can be computed rapidly because it
only uses the scaled data likelihood of a naive observer and the degree of commitment to
the current opinion. In particular, evaluation of surprise needs neither the lengthy evalu-
12
ation of the posterior under the current model nor an update of the model parameters - in
contrast to the Bayesian surprise model (Itti and Baldi, 2005; Baldi and Itti, 2010) with
which our surprise measure otherwise shares important properties (see Mathematical
Methods). The question of how surprise can be used to influence learning is the topic
of the next subsection.
We emphasize that our measure of surprise is not restricted to discrete models but
can also be formulated for models with continuous parameters θ (see Mathematical
Methods - Fig. 2A). Our proposed measure of surprise is consistent with formula-
tions of Schopenhauer that link surprise to the “incongruity between representation of
perception” (in our framework: the scaled likelihood response pˆX(θ) to a data X) and
“abstract representations” (in our framework: the current opinion pin(θ) formed from
previous data points); freely cited after (Hurley et al., 2011).
2.2 Surprise minimization: the SMiLe-rule
Successful learning implies an adaptation to the environment such that an event occur-
ring for a second time is perceived as less surprising than the first time. In the following
surprise minimization refers to a learning strategy which modifies the internal model
of the external world such that the unexpected observation becomes less surprising if
it happens again in the near future. Surprise minimization is akin to – though more
general than – reward prediction error learning. Reward based learning modifies the
reward expectation such that a recurring reward results in a smaller reward prediction
error. Similarly, surprise-minimization learning results in a smaller surprise for recur-
ring events.
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Figure 2: Confidence-corrected surprise and constraint surprise minimization. A.
The impact of confidence on surprise. Top: Two distinct internal models (red and
blue), described by joint distributions p(x, θ) (contour plots) over observable data x
and model parameters θ, may have the same marginal distribution Z(x) =
∫
θ
p(x, θ)dθ
(distributions along the x-axis coincide) but differ in the marginal distribution pin(θ) =∫
x
p(x, θ)dx (distributions along the θ-axis). Surprise measures that are computed with
respect to Z(x) neglect the uncertainty as measured by the entropy H(pin). Therefore, a
given data sample X (green dot) may be equally surprising in terms of the raw surprise
Sraw(X) [Eq (13)] but results in higher confidence-corrected surprise Scc(X) [Eq (2)]
for the blue as compared to the red model, because pin in the red model is wider (cor-
responding to a larger entropy) than in the blue model. Bottom: The scaled likelihood
pˆX(θ) (magenta) for the “red” internal model is calculated by evaluating the condi-
tional probability distribution functions p(x|θi) (specified by different color for each
θi) at x = X (intersection of dashed green line with colored curves). The confidence-
corrected surprise Scc(X) is the KL divergence between pˆX(θ) (bottom, magenta) and
pin(θ) (top, red). B. Solutions to the (constraint) optimization problem in Eq (5). The
objective function, i.e. the updated value of the surprise Scc(X; q) (black) for a given
data sample X , is a parabolic landscape over γ where each γ corresponds to a unique
belief distribution qγ . Its global minimum is at γ = 1 (corresponding to q1 = pˆX) which
is equivalent to discarding all previously observed samples. The boundary B constrains
the range of γ and thus the set of admissible belief distributions. At B = 0 no change is
allowed resulting in γ = 0 with an updated belief equal to the current belief pin (green).
B ≥ Bmax = DKL[pˆX ||pin] (red dashed line) implies that we allow to update the belief
to a distribution further away from the current belief than the sample itself so the opti-
mal solution is the scaled likelihood pˆX or γ = 1 as for the unconstrained problem. For
0 < B < Bmax (blue dashed line) the objective function is minimized by qγ in Eq (6)
that fulfills the constraint DKL[qγ||pin] = B with 0 < γ < 1.
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To mathematically formulate learning through surprise minimization, we define a
learning rule L(X, pin) as a mapping from the current belief pin(θ) to a new belief q(θ)
after receiving data sample X , i.e., q = L(X, pin). Moreover, we define a belief update
as the learning step after a single data sample.
We define the class L of plausible learning rules as the set of those learning rules L
for which the surprise S(X; q) of a given data sample X under the new belief q(θ) is at
most as surprising as the surprise S(X; pin) of that data sample under the current belief
pin(θ), i.e.,
L = {L : S(X; q) ≤ S(X; pin), q = L(X, pin),∀X ∈ X}. (3)
In other words, if the same data sample X occurs a second time right after a belief
update, it is perceived as less surprising than the first time.
After the belief update we have a new belief pin+1 = q and we may ask how much
the data X has impacted the internal model. To answer this question we compare the
surprise of data sample X under the previous belief to its surprise under the new belief:
∆S(X;L) = S(X; pin)− S(X; pin+1). (4)
Given a learning rule L, a data sample X is considered more effective for a belief
update than X ′, if ∆S(X;L) > ∆S(X ′;L). Note that definitions in Eqs (3) and (4) do
not depend on our specific choice of surprise measure S . In the following we choose S
to be the confidence-corrected surprise Scc [Eq (2)].
The impact function ∆Scc(X;L) [Eq (4)], for a given data sample X , is maximized
15
by the learning rule that maps the new belief pin+1(θ) to the scaled likelihood pˆX(θ).
However, as the distribution pin+1 = pˆX does not depend on the current belief pin, it
discards all previously learned information. Therefore, it amounts to a valid though
meaningless solution.
To avoid overfitting to the last data sample, we need to limit our search to updated
beliefs q that are not too different from the current opinion pin. This limited set can
be expressed as the set of new beliefs q that fulfill the constraint DKL[q||pin] ≤ B, for
some non-negative upper bound B ≥ 0. The parameter B determines how much we
allow our belief to change after receiving a data sample X . Maximizing the impact
function ∆Scc(X;L) under such a constraint, is equivalent to the following constraint
optimization problem:
min
q:DKL[q||pin]≤B
Scc(X; q). (5)
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers we find the solution of the minimization
problem in Eq (5) to be
qγ(θ) =
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)
, (6)
where Z(X; γ) =
∫
θ
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ dθ is a normalizing factor and the parameter γ
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is uniquely determined by the bound B (see Mathematical Methods
for the proof). Moreover, for γ < 1 the function γ(B) increases monotonously. The
unique relationship between γ and B means that once B has been chosen, γ is no
longer a free parameter and vice versa. Learning is implemented by using the solution
of Eq. (6) as the new opinion: pin+1(θ) = qγ(θ).
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Learning by updating according to Eq (6) will be called surprise minimization learn-
ing (SMiLe) and we will refer to Eq. (6) as the SMiLe-rule. The update step of the
SMiLe-rule is reminiscent of Bayes’ rule except for the parameter γ which modulates
the relative contribution of the likelihood p(X|θ) and the current belief pin(θ) to the new
belief pin+1(θ) = qγ(θ). Note that the SMiLe rule belongs to the class L of plausible
learning rules, for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Choosing γ in the range 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is equivalent to choosing a bound B ≥ 0. To
understand how the optimal solution in Eq (6), and thus γ, relates to the boundary B,
we illustrate its limiting cases (see Fig 2B): (i) B = 0 yields γ = 0 and the new belief
q is identical to the current belief pin. In other words, the new information is discarded.
(ii) For B ≥ Bmax = DKL[pˆX ||pin], the solution is always the scaled likelihood pˆX
(corresponding to γ = 1) because q = pˆX fulfills the constraint DKL[q||pin] ≤ B
for any B ≥ Bmax and minimizes Scc(X; q) among all possible belief distributions q.
This is equivalent to the unconstrained case, and implies that all previous information
is discarded. (iii) For 0 < B < Bmax the optimal solution is the new belief qγ [Eq (6)]
with 0 < γ < 1 satisfying DKL[qγ||pin] = B. Moreover, B > B′ implies γ > γ′ (see
Fig 2B, and Mathematical Methods for the proof).
While the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)] depends on a parameter γ which is uniquely deter-
mined by the bound B, we have yet to indicate how to choose B. Highly surprising
data should result in larger belief shifts. Therefore, the bound B should increase with
the level of surprise Scc.
The definition of an optimal (nonlinear) mapping from Scc to B (and thus to γ)
would require further assumptions about how surprise is related to the bound and we
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will therefore not search for optimality. However, it is instructive to study a few ex-
amples. For instance, if the nonlinear mapping were a step function, the system would
make a binary choice between either keeping the old belief or relying on the last new
data point. On the other hand, an extremely slow increase would amount to largely
ignoring the surprise and sticking to the same old belief. Therefore, the sharpness of
the transition in the mapping function matters. The exact link between the bound and
surprise is, however, not crucial as long as B is monotonic in surprise in a reasonable
way.
In the following, we choose a simple monotonic function to link the bound to the
surprise. For each data sample X , we take
B(X) =
mScc(X; pin)
1 +mScc(X; pin)
Bmax(X), (7)
where Bmax(X) = DKL[pˆX ||pin]. Here, the monotonic function depends on a subject-
specific parameterm that describes an organism’s propensity toward changing its belief.
Note that in Eq (7), m = 0 indicates that the subject will never change her belief. As m
increases so does a subject’s willingness to change her belief. We expect that differences
in m from one subject to the next will eventually allow us to capture heterogeneity in
belief update strategies when fitting human behavior. Although m is inserted in Eq (7)
to model subject dependence, one could also search for the best m algorithmically in a
given simulated environment or other computational setting.
Note that biological correlates of surprise such as pupil dilation or the activity of
a neuromodulator will normally saturate at some maximal value, consistent with our
choice of a saturating function in Eq (7).
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2.3 Surprise-modulated belief update
The surprise-modulated belief update combines the confidence-corrected surprise [Eq (2)]
and the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)] to dynamically update our belief: after receiving a new data
point X , we evaluate the surprise Scc(X; pin) which sets the bound B [Eq (7)] for our
update and allows us to solve for γ. We then update the belief, using the SMiLe rule
[Eq (6)] with parameter γ (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Pseudo algorithm for surprise-modulated belief update (SMiLe)
1: N ← number of data samples
2: Belief ← pi0 (the current belief)
3: m← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: for n: 1 to N do
5: Xn ← a new data sample
6: (i) evaluate the surprise Scc(Xn; Belief), Eq (2)
7: (ii-a) calculate Bmax(Xn) = DKL[pˆXn||Belief]
8: (ii-b) choose the bound B(Xn) =
mScc(Xn;Belief)
1+mScc(Xn;Belief)
Bmax(Xn)
9: (iii) find γ by solving DKL[qγ||Belief] = B(Xn)
10: (iv) update using SMiLe, Eq (6): Belief(θ)← p(Xn|θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ∫
θ p(Xn|θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ dθ
11: Return Belief;
Note 1: In each iteration, we first calculate the surprise, step (i), before the model
is updated in step (iv).
Note 2: The steps (ii-a), (ii-b), and (iii) can be merged and approximated by γ =
f(Scc(Xn; Belief)) where f(.) is a subjective function that increases with surprise.
The parameter γ in the SMiLe rule controls the impact of a data sample X on belief
update such that a bigger γ causes a larger impact. More precisely, the impact function
∆Scc(X;L) in Eq (4), where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)], is an increasing
function of γ (see Mathematical Methods for the proof).
We note that in classical models of perception and attention (Itti and Baldi, 2009;
Baldi and Itti, 2010), surprise has been defined as a measure of belief change such as
DKL[pin+1||pin] or its mirror form DKL[pin||pin+1] where pin+1 is calculated by Bayes
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formula, Eq (14). We emphasize that our model of surprise is “fast” in the sense that
it can be evaluated before the beliefs are changed. Interestingly, the impact function is
linked to the measure of belief change by the following equation (see Mathematical
Methods for derivation),
∆Scc(X;L) =
1
γ
DKL[pin||pin+1] +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
DKL[pin+1||pin] ≥ 0, (8)
where pin+1 = q is the new belief calculated with the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)]. Therefore a
larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
2.4 Simulations
In the following we will look at two examples to illustrate the functionality of our
proposed surprise-modulated belief update Algorithm 1. The first one is a simple, one-
dimensional dynamic decision-making task which has been used in behavioral stud-
ies (Nassar et al., 2012; Behrens et al., 2007) of learning under uncertainty. While
somewhat artificial as a task, it is appealing as it nicely isolates different forms of un-
certainty. This allows us: (i) to demonstrate the basic quantities and properties of our
algorithm, and (ii) to show how its flexibility allows it to capture a wide range of be-
haviors. The second example is a multi-dimensional maze-exploration task which we
will use to demonstrate how our algorithm extends to and performs in more complex
and realistic experimental environments.
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Gaussian estimation
Task. In the one-dimensional dynamic decision-making task, subjects are asked to
estimate the mean of a distribution based on consecutively and independently drawn
samples. At each time step n, a data sample Xn is drawn from a normal distribution
N (µn, σ2x) and the subject is asked to provide her current estimate µˆn of the mean of
the distribution. Throughout the experiment, the mean may change without warning
(Fig 3A). Changes occur with a hazard rate of H = 0.066. In Fig. 3C, 3D the hazard
rate H is varied. The variance σ2x remains fixed.
Model. We model the subject’s belief before the n-th sample Xn is observed, as
the normal distribution N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1) where µˆn−1 is the estimated mean and σ2n−1
determines how uncertain the subject is about her estimation. In order to keep the
scenario as simple as possible, we assume σ20 = σ
2
x.
Results for the estimation task. We find that the updated value of the mean µˆn
resulting from the surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1) is a weighted average
of the current estimate of the mean µˆn−1 and the new sample Xn (see Mathematical
Methods for derivation),
µˆn = γXn + (1− γ)µˆn−1. (9)
The weight factor, that determines to what extent a new sample Xn affects the new
mean µˆn, is determined by γ which increases with the surprise Scc(Xn) of that sample
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Figure 3: Gaussian mean estimation task. At each time step, a data sample Xn is
independently drawn from a normal distribution whose underlying mean may change
within the interval [−20, 20] at unpredictable change points. On average, the underlying
mean remains unchanged for 15 time steps corresponding to a hazard rate H = 0.066.
The standard deviation of the distribution is fixed to 4 and is assumed to be known to
the subject. A. Using a surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1), the estimated
mean (blue) quickly approaches the true mean (dashed red) given observed samples
(black circles). A few selected change points are indicated by green arrows. B. The
weight factor γ in Eq (10) (magenta) increases at the change points, resulting in higher
influence of newly acquired data samples on the new value of the mean. C. The estima-
tion error  per time step versus the weight factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in the delta-rule method
with constant γ for four different hazard rates. The minimum estimation error (for best
fixed γ) is achieved by a γ (points on the horizontal axis) that decreases with the hazard
rate, indicating that a bigger γ is preferred in volatile environments. Error bars indi-
cate standard deviation over all trials and 50 episodes. D. For all models, the average
estimation error  increases with the hazard rate. Moreover, surprise-modulated belief
update (SMile, dark blue) outperforms the delta-rule with the best fixed γ (Best fixed
γ, yellow). The best fixed γ for each hazard rate corresponds to the learning rate that
has minimal estimation error (indicated by points on the horizontal axis in sub-figure
C). Although the surprise-modulated SMile rule performs worse than the approximate
Bayesian delta-rule (Nassar et al., 2010) (App. Bayes, light blue), the difference in the
performance is not significant, except for the very small hazard rate of 0.01.
(Fig 3B), i.e.,
γ =
√
mScc(Xn)
1 +mScc(Xn)
, Scc(Xn) =
(Xn − µˆn−1)2
2σ2x
. (10)
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Note that in this example, the confidence-corrected surprise measure is related to the
normalized unsigned prediction error |Xn − µˆn−1|/σx. This outcome of our SMiLe-
update is consistent with recent approaches in reward learning that suggest to use reward
prediction errors scaled by standard deviation or variance (Preuschoff and Bossaerts,
2007).
The confidence-corrected surprise increases suddenly in response to the samples
immediately after the change points, as they are unexpected under the current belief.
As a consequence, surprising samples increase the influence of a new data sample on
the estimated mean (Fig 3B).
We compared our surprise modulated belief update [Eqs (9) and (10)] with a delta-
rule [Eq (9)] with constant weighting factor γ. To enable a fair comparison we consider
two situations: (i) we arbitrarily fix γ at 0.5 or (ii) for a given hazard rate H , we first
search for the optimal value of fixed γ so as to minimize the estimation error (Fig 3C).
We find that our surprise-modulated belief update outperforms the delta-rule with any
constant learning rate (Fig 3D). This clearly shows that an adaptive learning rate is
preferable to a fixed learning rate.
We also compared our proposed algorithm with a delta-rule that approximates the
optimal Bayesian solution (Nassar et al., 2010). In the optimal model, the subject knows
a-priori that the mean will change at unknown points in time, i.e., the subject makes use
of a hierarchical statistical model of the world. The algorithm proposed in (Nassar et al.,
2010) provides an efficient approximate solution to estimate the parameters of the hier-
archical model. In this algorithm, the subject increases the learning rate as a function
of the probability of encountering a change point at a given time step. This probability
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requires knowledge or online estimation of the hazard rate, which indicates how fre-
quently change points occur. Although our surprise-modulated belief update does not
outperform the approximate Bayesian delta-rule, the difference in performance is, in
most cases, not significant (see Fig 3D). In other words, our method, which does not re-
quire any information about the hazard rate, can nearly reach the quality of the optimal
Bayesian solution, with significantly reduced computational complexity. Note that the
SMiLe rule is not designed for (almost) stationary environments where no fundamental
change in context occurs. Therefore, in the case where the true mean is constant (low
hazard rate), the SMiLe rule results in increased volatility in estimation. This is why
the difference in performance of SMiLe and the optimized Bayesian delta-rule becomes
more evident for smaller hazard rates than bigger ones (see Fig 3D).
Maze exploration
Task. The maze exploration task is similar to tasks used in behavioral neuroscience
and robotics (Morris, 1984; Gillner and Mallot, 1998; Nelson et al., 2004; Rezende and
Gerstner, 2014). There are two environments A and B, each composed of the same
uniquely labeled (e.g., by colors or cue cards) rooms. A and B only differ in the spatial
arrangement (topology) of rooms (see Fig 4). Neighboring rooms are connected and
accessible through doors. Initially, the agent is placed into either A or B. At each time
step, a door of the current room opens and the agent moves into the adjacent room,
thus exploring the environment. After a random exploration time the environment is
switched. The agent is not informed that a switch has occurred. Once the environment
is changed, the agent must quickly adapt to the new environment. Note that this task
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differs from a reinforcement learning task because the task at hand just consists of the
exploration phase. In particular, there is no reward involved in learning.
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Figure 4: Maze exploration task. Environments A (left) and B (right) both consist of
16 rooms, but differ in topology. At each time step, one of the four available doors (up,
down, right, left) in the current room (e.g. s = 6) is randomly opened (with probability
0.25). While the learning agent is in environment A, the environment may change to
B with probability PA→B ≤ 0.1 in the next time step of duration ∆t. Similarly, PB→A
indicates the environment switches from B to A. Therefore, as the agent starts mov-
ing out of state s = 6, depending on the current environment and switch probabilities
PA→B and PB→A, it will end up in environment A (i.e., s′ ∈ {2, 10, 7, 5}) or B (i.e.,
s′ ∈ {10, 1, 3, 13}). The duration of a stay in environment A is therefore exponen-
tially distributed with mean τA = ∆t/PA→B, where the parameter τA determines the
time scale of stability in environment A, i.e., for larger τA an agent has more time for
adapting to A after a change point. The expected fraction of time spent in total within
environment A is equal to ψA = PB→A/(PB→A + PA→B). Note that τA and ψA are
two free parameters that we can change to study how the agent performs in different
circumstances (e.g., see Fig 8).
Model. We model the knowledge of the environment by a learning agent that up-
dates a set of parameters α(s, sˇ) ≥ 1 used for describing its belief about state transitions
from s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16} to sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\s, where 16 is the number of rooms. More
precisely, an agent’s belief about how likely it is to visit sˇ, given the current state s, is
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modeled by a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by a vector of parameters ~α(s) ∈ R15.
The components of the vector ~α(s) are denoted as α(s, sˇ). We emphasize that the agent
has a structurally incomplete model of the world since it does not know that there are
two different environments.
In order to see how well our proposed surprise-modulated belief update algorithm
performs in this task, we compare it with a naive Bayesian learner and an online expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm (Mongillo and Deneve, 2008). While in the former the
agent assumes that there is only a single stable, but stochastic environment, the latter
benefits from knowing the true hidden Markov model (HMM) of the task and approxi-
mates the optimal hierarchical Bayesian solution (see Mathematical Methods).
Results for the maze task. The surprise-modulated belief update (Algorithm 1),
with the Dirichlet distribution inserted, yields Algorithm 2 for the maze exploration
task (see Mathematical Methods for derivation). Immediately after a transition from
the current state s to the next state s′, the new belief qγ obtained by the SMiLe rule
[Eq (6)] is a Dirichlet distribution ~αnew(s) with components αnew(s, sˇ) = γ(1 + [sˇ =
s′])+(1−γ)αold(s, sˇ), that can be written as a weighted average of the parameters of the
current belief pin (i.e., αold(s, sˇ)) and those of the scaled likelihood pˆX (i.e., 1+[sˇ = s′]).
Here, [sˇ = s′] indicates a number that is 1 if the condition in square brackets is satisfied,
and 0 otherwise.
Similar to the Gaussian mean estimation task, surprise is initially high and slowly
decreases as the agent learns the topology of the environment (Fig 5A). When the en-
vironment is switched, the sudden increase in the surprise signal (Fig 5A) causes the
parameter γ to increase (Fig 5B). This is equivalent to discounting previously learned
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Algorithm 2 Surprise-modulated belief update for the maze exploration task
1: N ← number of data samples
2: α(s, sˇ) = 1, ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}, sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s} (a uniform prior belief)
3: m← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: Start in state s
5: for n: 1 to N do
# at this time step we only update the parameters that describe state transi-
tions from the current state s to all possible next states sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s}. The
current belief, for the state s, is pin−1 ∼ Dir(a), a ∈ R15, a(sˇ) = α(s, sˇ).
6: Xn : s→ s′ (a new transition is observed)
# the scaled likelihood is pˆX ∼ Dir(b),b ∈ R15, b(sˇ) = 1 + [sˇ = s′]
7: (i) Scc(Xn; pin−1) = DKL[Dir(a)||Dir(b)]
8: (ii-a) Bmax(Xn) = DKL[Dir(b)||Dir(a)]
9: (ii-b) B(Xn) =
mScc(Xn;pin−1)
1+mScc(Xn;pin−1)
Bmax(Xn)
10: (iii) find γ by solving DKL[Dir(γb + (1− γ)a)||Dir(a)] = B(Xn)
11: (iv) α(s, sˇ)← (1− γ)α(s, sˇ) + γ(1 + [sˇ = s′])
12: Return α(s, sˇ), ∀s, sˇ;
Note 1: DKL[Dir(m)||Dir(n)] = ln Γ(
∑
sˇ m(sˇ)) − ln Γ(
∑
sˇ n(sˇ)) −∑
sˇ ln Γ(m(sˇ)) +
∑
sˇ ln Γ(n(sˇ)) +
∑
sˇ(m(sˇ)− n(sˇ))(Ψ(m(sˇ))−Ψ(
∑
sˇ m(sˇ))).
Note 2: Γ(.) and Ψ(.) denote the gamma and digamma functions, respectively.
[sˇ = s′] denotes the Iverson bracket, a number that is 1 if the condition in square
brackets is satisfied, and 0 otherwise.
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information and results in a quick adaptation to the new environment. To quantify
the adaptation to the new environment, we compare the state transition probabilities of
the current model with the true transition probabilities of the two environments. We
find that the estimation error of the state transition probabilities in the new environ-
ment is quickly reduced after the switch points (Fig 5C). Following a change point,
the model uncertainty, measured as the entropy of the current belief about the state
transition probabilities, increases indicating that the current model of the topology is
inaccurate (Fig 5D). A few time steps later the uncertainty slowly decreases, indicating
increased confidence in what is learned in the new environment.
If we look more closely at the model parameters, we find that the surprise-modulated
belief update (Algorithm 2) enables the agent to adjust the estimated state transition
probabilities. In Fig 6 we compare the estimated and the true transition probabilities 100
time steps after a switch. Given that the environment is characterized by 64 different
transitions (in a space of 16 × 15 = 240 potential transitions), 100 time steps allow
an agent to explore only a fraction of the potential transitions. Nevertheless, 100 time
steps after a switch, the matrix of transition probabilities already resembles that of the
present environment (Figs 6C and 6D).
The surprise-modulated belief update is a method of quick learning. How well does
our SMiLe update rule perform relative to other existing models? We compared it with
two well-known models. First, we compared to a naive Bayesian learner which tries to
estimate the 240 state transition probabilities using Bayes rule. Note that, by construc-
tion, the naive Bayesian learner is not aware of the switches between the environments.
Second, we compared to a hierarchical statistical model that reflects the architecture of
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Figure 5: Time-series of relevant signals in the surprise-modulated belief update
(Algorithm 2) applied to the maze exploration task. All the curves have been
smoothed with an exponential moving average (EMA) with a decay constant 0.1. The
plots are shown for 1100 time steps (horizontal axis) toward the end of a simulation
with 20000 time steps. The agent visits environmentsA and B equally often and spends
on average 200 time steps in each environment before a switch occurs. Red bars in-
dicate the time that the agent explores environment A. Blue diamonds indicate 100
time steps after a change point from B to A. A. Confidence-corrected surprise Scc
[Eq (2)] (green) increases at switch points and decreases (with fluctuations) till the next
change point. B. The parameter γ (magenta) increases with the surprise at the change
points and causes the next data samples to be more effective on belief update than the
samples before the change point. C. The estimation errors for the transition matrix
Tˆ , EA[t] = ||Tˆ [t] − TA||2 = 256−1
∑
s,s′ [Tˆ [t](s, s
′) − TA(s, s′)]2 (solid black) and
EB[t] = ||Tˆ [t] − TB||2 (solid yellow) while in environment A and B, respectively, in-
dicate a rapid adaptation to the new environment after the change points. The dashed
black and yellow lines correspond to the estimation errors EA and EB, respectively,
when the naive Bayes rule (as a control experiment) is used for belief update. The naive
Bayes rule converges to a stationary solution (no significant change in the estimation
error after a switch of environment). D. The model uncertainty (light blue) increases for
a few time steps following a change in the environment, an alert that the current model
might be wrong. It then starts decreasing as the agent becomes more certain in the new
environment.
the true world as in Fig 4. The task is to estimate the 2 × 240 state transitions in the
two environments as well as transition probabilities between the environments pA→B
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Figure 6: True and estimated state transition probabilities in the maze exploration
task. The color intensity for each entry (s, s′) represents the probability of transition
from a current state s (row) to a next state s′ (column). A. The true state transi-
tion probability matrix TA(s, s′) in environment A. Each row TA(s, :) has only four
non-zero entries (small squares with the light brown color) whose position indicate
the neighboring rooms of state s in environment A. Note that ∑sˇ TA(s, sˇ) = 1 ,∀s.
B. The true state transition probability matrix TB(s, s′) for the environment B which
has a different topology compared to A. C. The estimated state transition proba-
bility matrix TˆA when the surprise-modulated Algorithm 2 is used for belief update.
TˆA = K−1
∑K
k=1 Tˆ [t
k
B→A+100] is calculated by averaging the estimated transition ma-
trix Tˆ [t] at 100 time steps after each of K change points tkB→A. Here, t
k
B→A denotes the
k-th time that the environment is changed from B toA and has remained unchanged for
at least the next 100 time steps (relevant time points are indicated by blue diamonds in
Fig 5). The similarity between TˆA and TA indicates that Algorithm 2 enables the agent
to quickly adapt to environmentA once a switch from B toA occurs. D. The estimated
transition matrix TˆB (similarly defined as TˆA but for environment B) when Algorithm 2
is used for belief update. Note its similarity to the true matrix TB. E-F. The estimated
state transition probability matrices TˆA (top) and TˆB (bottom) when the naive Bayesian
method (as a control experiment) is used for belief update. A Bayesian agent does not
adapt well to the new environment after a switch occurs, because it learns a weighted
average of true transition matrices TA and TB, where the weight is proportional to the
fraction of time spent in each environment. Since both environments are visited equally
in this experiment, the estimated quantities approach (TA + TB)/2.
and pB→A by an online EM algorithm.
For the naive Bayesian learner, we find that its behavior indicates a steady increase
in certainty, regardless of how surprising the samples are. In other words, it is incapable
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of changing its belief after it has sufficiently explored the environments (Fig 5C). The
state transition probabilities are estimated by averaging over the true parameters of both
environments, where the weight of averaging is determined by the fraction of time spent
in the corresponding environment (Figs 6E and 6F).
The comparison of our surprise-modulated belief update with the online EM algo-
rithm (Mongillo and Deneve, 2008) for the hierarchical Bayesian model associated with
the changing environments provides several insights (see Fig 7). First, already after less
than 1000 time steps, the estimation error for environment A during short episodes in
environment A drops below EA = 0.002. The online EM algorithm takes 10 times
longer to achieve the same level of accuracy. While the solution of the SMiLe rule in
the long run is not as good as that of the online EM algorithm, our algorithm benefits
from a reduced computational complexity and simpler implementation.
To further investigate the ability of an agent to adapt to the new environment after a
switch, we analyzed performance as a function of two free parameters that control the
setting of the task: (i) the fraction of time spent in environment A, and (ii) the average
time spent in environment A before a switch to B occurs. To do so, we calculate the
average estimation error in state transition probabilities 64 time steps after a switch
occurs. We consider only those switches after which the agent stays in that environment
for at least 64 time steps. Note that 64 is the minimum number of time steps that is
required to ensure that all possible transitions from 16 room to their 4 neighbors could
occur. A smaller estimation error for a given pair of free parameters indicates a faster
adaptation to the new environment for that setting.
We found that the surprise-modulated belief enables an agent to quickly readjust its
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Figure 7: Comparison of surprise-modulated belief update with an online EM algo-
rithm for the hierarchical Bayesian model. A. The estimation errorEA (vertical axis)
of state transition probabilities within environment A versus time (horizontal axis), for
surprise-modulated belief update (black) and online EM learner (blue). Bottom plots
depict zooms during the early (left) and late (right) phases of a simulation of 20000 time
steps. In the early phase of learning (bottom left), the surprise-modulated belief update
enables the agent to quickly learn model parameters after a switch to environment A
(indicated by red bars). In the late phase of learning (right), however, the online EM
algorithm adapts to the new environment faster and more accurately than the surprise-
modulated belief update. B. The inferred probability PA of being in environment A
(blue, right vertical axis) used in the online EM algorithm, and the confidence-corrected
surprise Scc (black, left vertical axis) used in the surprise-modulated belief update.
estimation of model parameters, even if the fraction of time spent in an environment
is relatively short. In that sense, it behaves similarly to the approximate hierarchical
Bayesian approach (online EM algorithm). This is not, however, the case for a naive
Bayesian learner whose estimation error in each environment depends on the fraction
of time spent in the corresponding environment (see Fig 8).
The naive Bayesian learner suffers from low accuracy in estimation and cannot
adapt to environmental changes. A full hierarchical Bayesian model, however, requires
prior information about the task and is computationally demanding. For example, the
computational load of the hierarchical Bayesian model increases with the number N of
environments between which switching occurs. The surprise-modulated belief update,
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Figure 8: The estimation error  in the maze exploration task, as a function
of (1) the average time spent in environment A before a switch to environment B
(τA = ∆t/pA→B, vertical axis) and (2) the fraction of time spent in environment A
(ψA = PB→A/(PB→A + PA→B), horizontal axis). A. The average estimation error (of
state transition probabilities), 64 time steps after a switch from B to A, when surprise-
modulated belief update (Algorithm 2) is used for learning. The spread of blue color
(lower estimation error) illustrates that the surprise-modulated belief update enables an
agent to quickly adapt to the environment visited after a switch. For each pair (τA, ψA),
the simulation is repeated for 20 episodes, each consisting of 20000 time steps. In each
episode a different rearrangement of rooms for building environment B is used to make
sure that the result is not biased by a specific choice of this environment. B. The aver-
age estimation error when the online EM algorithm is used for learning the hierarchical
statistical model. C. The average estimation error when the naive Bayesian learner is
used for belief update. The estimation error for this model is mainly determined by the
fraction of time spent in environment A (i.e., ψA). The estimation error decreases with
the time spent in environment A, regardless of the time scale of stability determined by
τA.
however, balances accuracy and computational complexity: computational complex-
ity remains, by construction, independent of the number of switched environments. In
other words, since we accept from the beginning that our model of the world will be
approximate and structurally incomplete, the model can perform reasonably well after
having seen a small number of data samples.
3 Discussion
Surprise is a widely used concept describing a range of phenomena from unexpected
events to behavioral responses. Existing approaches to quantifying surprise are ei-
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ther data-centric (Shannon, 1948; Tribus, 1961; Palm, 2012) or model-centric (Baldi
and Itti, 2010; Itti and Baldi, 2005), and may be objective in a known model of the
world (Shannon, 1948; Tribus, 1961) or subject-dependent and rely on a learned model
of the world (Palm, 2012; Baldi and Itti, 2010; Itti and Baldi, 2005), but are always
linked to uncertainty. We emphasize that in order for surprise to be behaviorally mean-
ingful, it has to be defined for a single data sample such that an organism can respond
to a single event. In contrast, information theoretic quantities, such as data entropy and
mutual information, are usually defined as average quantities.
Based on our definition of surprise, we proposed a new framework for surprise-
driven learning. There are two components to this framework: (i) a confidence-adjusted
surprise measure to capture environmental statistics as well as the commitment of the
subject to his belief, and (ii) the surprise-minimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule,
which dynamically adjusts the balance between new and old information without prior
assumptions about the temporal statistics in the environment. Within this framework,
surprise is a single subject-specific variable that determines a subject’s propensity to
modify existing beliefs. This algorithm is suitable for learning in complex environments
that are either stable or undergo gradual or sudden changes using a world model that
may not match the complexity of the world. Sudden changes are signalled by high
surprise and result in placing more weight on new information. The significance of the
proposed method is that it neither requires knowledge of the full Bayesian model of the
environment nor any prior assumption about the temporal statistics in the environment.
Moreover, it provides a simple framework that could potentially be implemented in a
neurally plausible way using probabilistic population codes (Ma et al., 2006; Beck et al.,
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2008).
3.1 Relation to Bayesian surprise
One of the existing approaches for measuring surprise is Bayesian surprise (Baldi and
Itti, 2010; Itti and Baldi, 2009) which is generally defined as a distance or dissimilarity
measure between prior and posterior beliefs where the updating is performed according
to Bayes’ rule. With this measure, a data sample X is more surprising than a data
sample X ′ if it causes a larger change in the subject’s belief. One of the shortcomings
of the Bayesian surprise is that it can be evaluated only after the learning step (i.e.,
once we have changed our belief from prior to posterior). However, behavioral and
neural responses indicate that surprise is nearly concurrent with the unexpected event,
since physiological signals such as the P300 component of the EEG occur within less
than 400 ms. Our working hypothesis is that the brain evaluates surprise even before
recognition, inference or learning occurs. We thus need to evaluate surprise before
we update our belief so that surprise may control learning rather than emerge from it.
This property is fulfilled in the confidence-corrected surprise measure introduced in this
paper.
Information content and Bayesian surprise are two distinct yet complementary ap-
proaches to measuring surprise. Information content is about data as it captures the
inherent likelihood of a piece of data given a model. While its evaluation is rapid given
a world model, we normally (outside an engineered lab environment) do not have ac-
cess to the true underlying parameter θ∗. Bayesian surprise is about a model. Since it
measures the change in belief (i.e., in the model parameters), it is subject-dependent
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and does not require knowing θ∗. However, it is computed only after learning, whereas
neural data suggests response to surprise within 400 ms. Our definition of confidence-
corrected surprise combines these two measures to use their complementary benefits
and overcome their shortcomings (see Mathematical Methods).
3.2 New versus old information
The proposed algorithm’s performance is primarily driven by two features: (i) the algo-
rithm adaptively increases the influence of new data on the belief update as a function
of how surprising the data was; and (ii) the algorithm increases model uncertainty in the
face of surprising data thus increasing the influence of new data on current and future
belief updates. The importance of the first point has been recognized and incorporated
previously (Nassar et al., 2012; Pearce and Hall, 1980). The second point is particularly
worth noting: a surprising sample not only signals a potential change, it also signals that
our current model may be wrong, so that we should be less certain about its accuracy.
This increase in model uncertainty implies discounting the influence of past information
in current and future belief updates.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and
newly acquired data on learning (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2012; Krugel et al.,
2009; Pearce and Hall, 1980) and rapidly adapt to changing environments (Pearce and
Hall, 1980; Wilson et al., 1992; Holland, 1997). Standard Bayesian and reinforcement
learning models in humans (Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001) or animals (Dayan et al.,
2000; Kakade and Dayan, 2002) assume a stable environment and are slow to adapt to
sudden changes in the environment. To quickly learn in dynamic environments, models
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need to include a way to detect and respond to sudden changes.
A full (hierarchical) Bayesian approach works only if the subject is aware of the
correct model of the task, (e.g., the time scale of change in the environment or the num-
ber of environments between which switches occur). Calculating the probability of a
change point in a Gaussian estimation task (Nassar et al., 2010), estimating the volatility
of the environment in a reversal learning task (Behrens et al., 2007), and dynamically
forgetting the past information with a controlled time constant (Ru¨ter et al., 2012) are all
examples of addressing learning in changing environments without explicit knowledge
of the full Bayesian model.
In changing environments, hierarchical Bayesian models outperform the standard
delta-rule with a fixed learning rate. However, hierarchical models either make assump-
tions about how fast the world is changing on average or about the underlying data gen-
erating process, in order to accurately detect a change in the environment. While our
proposed surprise-based algorithm may not be theoretically optimal, it approximates
the optimal (hierarchical) Bayesian solution without making any such assumption.
3.3 Model uncertainty
The ability of our proposed method to increase model uncertainty solves a common
problem in standard Bayesian learning, namely, a model uncertainty or a learning rate
approaching zero when the number of data samples increases. This is particularly
prominent in Bayes’ rule which is derived under the assumption of stationarity and
which thus reduces uncertainty in each step no matter how surprising a sample is. The
SMiLe rule [Eq (6)] guarantees that a small model uncertainty remains even after a long
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stationary period. This remaining uncertainty ensures that an organism can still detect a
change even after having spent an extensive amount of time in a given environment (see
Fig 5C). One might argue, that reducing the learning rate to zero after extensive train-
ing is desirable under certain conditions as it corresponds to the well-documented phe-
nomenon of overtraining whereby an organism no longer responds to changes in goal
value. We would argue that this insensitivity is a consequence of behavioral control be-
ing handed over to the habitual system and thus to a different neural substrate (Balleine
and O’Doherty, 2010; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Redgrave et al., 2010).
3.4 Potential applications
Surprise minimization is a more general approach to learning than learning by reward
prediction error. Recent approaches in reward learning suggest using a scaled reward
prediction error (Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007). A recurring problem in reward-based
learning is the observation that subjects use different learning rates on a trial-by-trial
basis even in stable environments. Researchers typically assume an average learning
rate for fitting data. Note that in our approach, the learning rate varies naturally as a
function of the last data point (as it should) while keeping the subject-specific parameter
m constant.
Note that both confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule have wide-reaching
implications outside the framework presented here. On the one hand, our surprise mea-
sure can not only modulate learning, but can be used as a trigger signal for an algorithm
that needs to choose between several uncertain states or actions as is the case in change
point detection (Nassar et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 2013; Ru¨ter et al., 2012), memory and
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cluster formation (Gershman and Niv, 2015), exploration/exploitation tradeoff (Cohen
et al., 2007; Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011), novelty detection (Knight et al., 1996;
Bishop, 1994), and network reset (Bouret and Sara, 2005). On the other hand, the
SMiLe-rule could add flexibility in learning and replace existing learning algorithms
in scenarios where dynamically balancing old and new information is desired. This
includes fitting γ to behavioral data without computing surprise or controlling γ by
something other than surprise. Replacing the full Bayesian model of a learning task
in changing environment with the SMile rule simplifies calculations, which makes the
SMiLe-framework suitable for fitting relevant parameters to behavioral data.
3.5 Experimental predictions
There is ample evidence for a neural substrate of surprise. Existing measures of expec-
tation violations such as absolute and variance-scaled reward prediction errors (Schultz,
2016, 2015), unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005) and risk prediction er-
rors (Preuschoff et al., 2008) have been linked to different neuromodulatory systems.
Among those, the noradrenergic system has emerged as a prime candidate for signal-
ing unexpected uncertainty and surprise: noradrenergic neurons respond to unexpected
changes such as the presence of a novel stimulus, unexpected pairing of stimulus with
a reinforcement during conditioning, and reversal of the contingencies (Sara and Segal,
1991; Sara et al., 1994; Vankov et al., 1995; Aston-Jones et al., 1997). The P300 com-
ponent of the event-related potential (Pineda et al., 1997; Missonnier et al., 1999) which
is associated with novelty (Donchin et al., 1978) and surprise (Jaskowski et al., 1994) is
modulated by Noradrenaline. It also modulates pupil size (Costa and Rudebeck, 2016)
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as a physiological response to surprise. The dynamics of the noradrenergic system are
fast enough to quickly respond to unexpected events (Rajkowski et al., 1994; Clayton
et al., 2004; Bouret and Sara, 2004), a functional requirement for surprise to control
learning; see (Sara, 2009; Bouret and Sara, 2005; Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005) for
a review. We predict that in experiments with changing environments, the activity of
Noradrenaline should exhibit a high correlation with the confidence-corrected surprise
signal.
Note that Acetylcholine (ACh), on the other hand, is a candidate neuromodulator for
encoding expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005) and thus is linked to the model
uncertainty (although it might also be linked to other forms of uncertainty such as envi-
ronmental stochasticity).
A variety of experimental findings are consistent with and can be explained by our
definition of confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule. It has been shown both
theoretically (Yu and Dayan, 2005) and empirically (Gu, 2002) that Noradrenaline and
ACh interact such that ACh sets a threshold for Noradrenaline to indicate fundamental
changes in the environment (Yu and Dayan, 2005). This is consistent with our hypothe-
sis that if an agent is uncertain about its current model of the world, unexpected events
are perceived as less surprising than when the agent is almost certain about the model
(which is the key idea behind the confidence-corrected surprise). The impairment of
adaptation to contextual changes due to Noradrenaline depletion (Sara, 1998) can be
explained by the incapability of subjects to respond to surprising events signaled by
Noradrenaline. The absence/suppression of ACh (low model uncertainty) implies little
or no variability of the environment so that even small prediction error signals are per-
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ceived as surprising (Jones and Higgins, 1995), consistent with the excessive activation
of noradrenergic system in such situations.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that Noradrenaline and ACh both affect synap-
tic plasticity in the cortex and the hippocampus (Gu, 2002; Bear and Singer, 1986),
suppress cortical processing (Kimura et al., 1999; Kobayashi et al., 2000), and facilitate
information processing from thalamus to the cerebral cortex (Gil et al., 1997; Hasselmo
et al., 1996; Hsieh et al., 2000). This is consistent with our theory that surprise balances
the influence of newly acquired data (thalamocortical pathway) and old information
(corticocortical pathway) during belief update.
In summary, we proposed a measure of surprise and a surprise-modulated belief up-
date algorithm that can be used for modeling how humans and animals learn in changing
environments. Our results suggest that the proposed method can approximate an opti-
mal hierarchical Bayesian learner, with significantly reduced computational complexity,
but at the cost of an imperfect model of the world. Our model provides a framework
for future studies on learning with surprise. These include computational studies, such
as how the proposed model can be neurally implemented, neurobiological studies, such
as unraveling the interaction between different neural circuits that are functionally in-
volved in learning under surprise, and behavioral studies with human subjects.
4 Mathematical Methods
In this section we provide mathematical explanations or proofs for statements made in
the ‘Results’ Section.
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4.1 The scaled likelihood is the posterior belief under a flat prior
Assume that all model parameters θ stay in some bounded convex interval of volume
A. The volume A can be arbitrarily large. Given a data sample X , the posterior belief
pflat(θ|X) about the model parameters θ (derived by the Bayes rule) under the assump-
tion of a flat prior pˆi0(θ) = 1/A is:
pflat(θ|X) = p(X|θ)pˆi0(θ)∫
θ
p(X|θ)pˆi0(θ) dθ =
p(X|θ)∫
θ
p(X|θ) dθ =
p(X|θ)
||pX || = pˆX(θ), (11)
where ||pX || =
∫
θ
p(X|θ)dθ is a data-dependent constant. Therefore, the scaled likeli-
hood pˆX(θ) is the posterior under a flat prior. Note that the result is independent of the
volume of A so that we take the limit of A→∞.
4.2 Confidence-corrected surprise increases with Shannon surprise
and Bayesian surprise
The confidence-corrected surprise in Eq. (2) can be expressed as:
Scc(X; pin) = −
∫
θ
pin(θ) ln p(X|θ) + ln ||pX || −H(pin), (12)
where ||pX || is a data-dependent constant defined above, andH(pin) = −
∫
θ
pin(θ) lnpin(θ)dθ
denotes the entropy of the current belief. Let us call the first term − ∫
θ
pin(θ) ln p(X|θ)
in Eq. (12) the raw surprise Sraw(X; pin) of a data sample X:
Sraw(X; pin) = −
∫
θ
pin(θ) ln p(X|θ) dθ, (13)
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We want to show that the raw surprise Sraw(X; pin) in Eq. (13) increases with the Shan-
non surprise and the Bayesian surprise.
The Bayesian surprise (Itti and Baldi, 2009; Baldi and Itti, 2010) measures a change
in belief induced by the observation of a new data sample X = Xn+1. It is defined as
a KL divergence DKL[pin||pin+1] between the prior belief pin and the posterior belief
pin+1(θ) that is calculated from the naive Bayes rule
pin+1(θ) =
p(X|θ)pin(θ)∫
θ
p(X|θ)pin(θ) dθ . (14)
The Shannon surprise (Shannon, 1948; Tribus, 1961; Palm, 2012) is the the information
content of data point X = Xn+1 calculated with the current world model of the subject.
If the true model of the world (i.e., θ∗) is known, the information content − ln p(X|θ∗)
for a specific outcome X ∈ X is the negative log-likelihood of this data point (Tribus,
1961; Shannon, 1948; Palm, 2012). In other words, the occurrence of a rare (i.e., un-
likely to occur) data sample X is surprising. As the information content relates to
the true probabilities p(X|θ∗) of samples in the real world, it is an objective, model-
independent, measure of unexpectedness. However, we work under the assumption that
the true set of parameters θ∗, and thus the true probability p(X|θ∗), is not known to
the observer, such that it is difficult to evaluate the exact information content of a data
sample X . The Shannon surprise is defined as the negative-log-marginal-likelihood
− lnZ(X), where Z(X) = ∫
θ
p(X|θ)pin(θ)dθ is the probability of data sample X after
marginalizing out all the possible model parameters.
In the following, small numbers above an equality sign refer to equations in the
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text. The raw surprise Sraw(X; pin) in Eq (13) is a linear combination of both Bayesian
surprise and Shannon surprise, because
Sraw(X; pin)
(13)
= −
∫
θ
pin(θ) ln p(X|θ) dθ
(14)
= −
∫
θ
pin(θ) ln
[pin+1(θ) (∫θ p(X|θ)pin(θ) dθ)
pin(θ)
]
dθ
= DKL[pin||pin+1]− ln
[ ∫
θ
p(X|θ)pin(θ) dθ
]
, (15)
where the first term DKL[pin||pin+1] stands for the Bayesian surprise, and the second
term− ln [ ∫
θ
p(X|θ)pin(θ) dθ
]
stands for the Shannon surprise. Therefore, the raw sur-
prise Sraw(X; pin) in Eq (15) combines both the data-driven approach of Shannon (in-
formation content) and the model-change driven approach for Itti and Baldi (Bayesian
surprise).
4.3 Less likely data lead to a larger surprise Scc
Our proposed confidence-corrected surprise measure Scc(X; pin) in Eq (2) inherits the
property of the raw surprise Sraw(X; pin) in Eq (15) which in turn is a linear combination
of Bayesian surprise and Shannon surprise. Therefore it inherits the properties of the
Shannon surprise. In particular, for a fixed opinion pin, a less likely data point leads to
a larger surprise.
4.4 Committed subjects are more surprised than uncommitted ones
The value of the confidence-corrected surprise Eq. (12) depends on a subject’s com-
mitment to her belief. The commitment to the current model of the world is repre-
44
sented by the negative entropy −H(pin) =
∫
θ
pin(θ) lnpin(θ)dθ. Eq. (12) shows that the
confidence-corrected surprise decreases with entropy indicating an increases with com-
mitment. Therefore, given the same likelihood of the data under two different world
models, the subject with a stronger commitment (smaller entropy) is more surprised
than the subject with a weaker commitment (higher entropy); cf. the example of Fig.
2A.
Intuitively, if we are uncertain about what to expect (because we have not yet learned
the structure of the world), receiving a data sample that occurs with low probability
under the present model is less surprising than a low-probability sample in a situation
when we are almost certain about the world (see Fig 2A).
4.5 Calculation of surprise for the example of CEO election
If candidate 1 is selected, the surprise of colleague B, Scc(X = 1;piB) is bigger by
0.75 ln (1−)
/3
> 0 than the surprise of colleague A, Scc(X = 1; piA). Both colleagues
are equally committed to their believes, but the outcome “candidate 1” is less likely for
colleague B than A. The evaluation of surprise yields
Scc(X = 1;pi
B)− Scc(X = 1;piA) =
∑
k
piB(θk) ln
piB(θk)
pˆX=1(θk)
−
∑
k
piA(θk) ln
piA(θk)
pˆX=1(θk)
= −H(piB) +H(piA) +
∑
k
(
piA(θk)− piB(θk)
)
ln pˆX=1(θk)
=
∑
k
(
piA(θk)− piB(θk)
)
ln pˆX=1(θk)
= 0.75 ln
(1− )
/3
> 0. (16)
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Therefore B is more surprised than A.
For colleague A, surprise of the outcome “candidate 2”, Scc(X = 2; piA), is bigger
by 0.5 ln 1−
/3
> 0 than the surprise of outcome “candidate 1” (his favorite), Scc(X =
1;piA) because the second candidate is less likely in his opinion; cf. point (ii) at the
beginning of the subsection “Definition of Surprise”:
Scc(X = 2;pi
A)− Scc(X = 1;piA) =
∑
k
piA(θk)
(
ln
piA(θk)
pˆX=2(θk)
− ln pi
A(θk)
pˆX=1(θk)
)
=
∑
k
piA(θk) ln
pˆX=1(θk)
pˆX=2(θk)
= 0.75 ln
1− 
/3
+ 0.25 ln
/3
1− 
= 0.5 ln
1− 
/3
> 0. (17)
More importantly, however, if the second candidate wins, the surprise of colleague
A, Scc(X = 2; piA), is bigger than that of colleague C, Scc(X = 2; piC), even though
both have assigned the same low likelihood to the second candidate. The evaluation of
surprise yields
Scc(X = 2;pi
A)− Scc(X = 2;piC) =
∑
k
piA(θk) ln
piA(θk)
pˆX=2(θk)
−
∑
k
piC(θk) ln
piC(θk)
pˆX=2(θk)
=
∑
k
(
piC(θk)− piA(θk)
)
ln pˆX=2(θk)
−H(piA) +H(piC). (18)
The terms with the ln in Eq. (18) add up to zero (i.e., −0.5 ln /3 + 0 ln(1 − ) +
0.25 ln /3 + 0.25 ln /3 = 0), so that we just need to evaluate the entropies to find
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Scc(X = 2;pi
A)− Scc(X = 2;piC) = −H(piA) +H(piC)
= 0.75 ln 0.75 + 0.25 ln 0.25 + ln 4
= 0.75 ln 3 > 0 (19)
In other words, since colleague A is more committed to his opinion than colleague C,
i.e. H(piC) > H(piA), he will be more surprised; cf. point (iii):
4.6 Derivation of the SMiLe rule
We note that the KL divergence DKL[a||b] is convex with respect to the first argu-
ment a. Therefore, both the objective function Scc(X; q) in Eq (2) and the constraint
DKL[q||pin] ≤ B in the optimization problem in Eq (5) are convex with respect to q,
which ensures the existence of the optimal solution.
We solve the constraint optimization by introducing a non-negative Lagrange mul-
tiplier λ−1 ≥ 0 and a Lagrangian
L(q, λ) = Scc(X; q)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[q||pin])
(12)
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln q(θ) + 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
pin(θ)
〉
q
− B
λ
+ ln ||p||, (20)
where 〈.〉q denotes the average with respect to q. Similar to the standard approach that
is used in support vector machines (Scho¨lkopf and Smola, 2002), the Lagrangian L de-
fined in Eq (20) must be minimized with respect to the primal variable q and maximized
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with respect to the dual variable λ (i.e., a saddle point must be found). Therefore the
constraint problem in Eq (5) can be expressed as
arg min
q
max
λ≥0
L(q, λ). (21)
By taking the derivative of L with respect to q and setting it equal to zero,
∂L
∂q
= − ln p(X|θ) + [1 + ln q(θ)]+ 1
λ
[
1 + ln
q(θ)
pin(θ)
]
= 0, (22)
we find that the Lagrangian in Eq (20) is minimized by the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)], i.e.,
q(θ) ∝ p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ , where γ is determined by the Lagrange multiplier λ:
0 ≤ γ = λ
λ+ 1
≤ 1, (23)
Note that the constant Z(X; γ) in Eq (6) follows from normalization of q(θ) to
integral one.
4.7 A larger boundB > B′ on belief change implies a bigger γ > γ′
in the SMiLe rule
For 0 < B < Bmax the solution of optimization problem in Eq (5) is the updated belief
qγ [Eq (6)] with 0 < γ < 1 satisfying DKL[qγ||pin] = B. In order to prove that B > B′
implies γ > γ′, we just need to show that DKL[qγ||pin] is an increasing function of γ
and thus its first derivative with respect to γ is always non-negative.
For this purpose, we first need to evaluate the derivative of qγ(θ), [Eq (6)], with
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respect to γ:
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) =
1
Z(X; γ)
∂
∂γ
[
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ
]
+ p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ ∂
∂γ
[ 1
Z(X; γ)
]
=
1
Z(X; γ)
[
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ ln p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
]− p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)2
∂
∂γ
[
Z(X; γ)
]
= qγ(θ) ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
− qγ(θ) 1
Z(X; γ)
[ ∫
θ
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ dθ
]
= qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)
. (24)
Note also that
∫
θ
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) dθ
(24)
=
∫
θ
qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)
dθ = 0. (25)
Then we calculate the derivative of DKL[qγ||pin] with respect to γ:
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∂∂γ
DKL[qγ||pin] =
∫
θ
∂
∂γ
[
qγ ln
qγ(θ)
pin(θ)
]
dθ
=
∫
θ
(
ln
qγ(θ)
pin(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
+ qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
ln
qγ(θ)
pin(θ)
])
dθ
=
∫
θ
(
ln
qγ(θ)
pin(θ)
+ 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(6)
=
∫
θ
(
γ ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
− lnZ(X; γ) + 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(25)
= γ
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(24)
= γ
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
) (
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= γ
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)2
qγ(θ) dθ
− γ
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= γ
〈(ln p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)2〉
qγ
−
(〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)2
= γ var[ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
] ≥ 0. (26)
4.8 The impact of a data sample X on belief update increases with
γ in the SMiLe rule
To prove the statement above we need to show that the impact function ∆Scc(X;L) in
Eq (4), where the SMiLe rule Eq (6) is used for belief update (i.e., when pin+1 = qγ),
increases with the parameter γ. In the following we show that the first derivative of the
impact function ∆Scc(X;L(γ)) with respect to γ is always non-negative.
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∂∂γ
∆Scc(X;L(γ)) = − ∂
∂γ
Scc(X; qγ)
(2)
=
∫
θ
∂
∂γ
[
qγ ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
=
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
+ qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
])
dθ
=
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
− 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(6)
=
∫
θ
(
(1− γ) ln p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
+ lnZ(X; γ)− 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(25)
= (1− γ)
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(24)
= (1− γ)
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= (1− γ)
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)2
qγ(θ) dθ
− (1− γ)
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
∫
θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= (1− γ)
〈(ln p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
)2〉
qγ
−
(〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
)2
= (1− γ) var[ln p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
] ≥ 0. (27)
4.9 A larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in
belief
The minimal value of the Lagrangian L(q, λ) in Eq (20) that is achieved by the updated
belief qγ in Eq (6), obtained by the SMiLe rule, is equal to
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L(qγ, λ)
(20)
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln qγ(θ) + 1
λ
ln
qγ(θ)
pin(θ)
〉
qγ
=C︷ ︸︸ ︷
−B
λ
+ ln ||p||
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln p(X|θ)
γpin(θ)
1−γ
Z(X; γ)
+
1
λ
ln
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)pin(θ)
〉
qγ
+ C
=
〈
(−1 + γ + γ
λ
) ln p(X|θ) + (1− γ − γ
λ
) lnpin − (1 + 1
λ
) lnZ(X; γ)
〉
qγ
+ C
=
〈(
−1 + γ(1 + 1
λ
)
)
ln
p(X|θ)
pin(θ)
− (1 + 1
λ
) lnZ(X; γ)
〉
qγ
+ C
= −1
γ
lnZ(X; γ) + C. (28)
Note that we used the equality 1
γ
= 1 + 1
λ
, from Eq (23), in the last line of Eq (28).
If the optimal solution qγ is approximated by any other potential next belief q, then
its corresponding functional value L(q, λ) differs from its minimal value L(qγ, λ) in
proportion to the KL divergence DKL[q||qγ]. This is because,
L(q, λ)− L(qγ, λ) (20),(28)=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln q(θ) + 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
pin(θ)
〉
q
+
1
γ
lnZ(X; γ)
=
1
γ
〈
− ln p(X|θ)γ + ln q(θ)γ + ln
(
q(θ)
pin(θ)
) γ
λ
+ lnZ(X; γ)
〉
q
=
1
γ
〈
ln
q(θ)γ(1+
1
λ
)Z(X; γ)
p(X|θ)γpin(θ) γλ
〉
q
=
1
γ
〈
ln
q(θ)Z(X; γ)
p(X|θ)γpin(θ)1−γ
〉
q
=
1
γ
DKL[q||qγ]. (29)
Replacing q with pin in Eq (29) follows the impact function ∆Scc(X;L) in Eq (4) to
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be,
∆Scc(X;L(γ)) = Scc(X; pin)− Scc(X; qγ)
(20)
= L(pin, λ) +
1
λ
B − L(qγ, λ)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[qγ||pin])
= L(pin, λ)− L(qγ, λ) + 1
λ
DKL[qγ||pin]
(29)
=
1
γ
DKL[pin||qγ] + 1
λ
DKL[qγ||pin]
(23)
=
1
γ
DKL[pin||qγ] +
(
1
γ
− 1
)
DKL[qγ||pin] ≥ 0. (30)
Note that qγ is the updated belief under the SMiLe rule, i.e., pin+1 = qγ . Therefore,
the reduction in the surprise upon a second exposure to the same data sample is related
to the belief changes DKL[pin||pin+1] and DKL[pin+1||pin] via Eq (30). Note that the
equality in Eq (30) holds if and only if there is no change in the current belief, i.e., if
qγ = pin+1 = pin. This happens only if γ = 0 which is equivalent to neglecting the new
data point when updating the belief.
4.10 The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by Gaussian distribution
Suppose we have drawn n − 1 samples X1, ..., Xn−1 from a Gaussian distribution of
known variance σ2x, but unknown mean. The empirical mean after n − 1 samples is
µˆn−1.
Assume that the current belief about the mean µ is a normal distribution, i.e.,
pin−1(µ) ∼ N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1). Since the likelihood of receiving a new sample Xn is
also normal, i.e., p(Xn|µ) ∼ N (µ, σ2x), the updated belief obtained by the SMiLe rule
[Eq (6)] is
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qγ(µ) ∝
(
exp
(
−(Xn − µ)
2
2σ2x
))γ (
exp
(
−(µ− µˆn−1)
2
2σ2n−1
))1−γ
∝ exp
(
−(Xn − µ)
2
2(σ′x)2
)
exp
(
−(µ− µˆn−1)
2
2(σ′n−1)2
)
, (31)
where (σ′x)
2 = σ2x/γ and (σ
′
n−1)
2 = σ2n−1/(1 − γ). Because the product of two
Gaussians is a Gaussian, we arrive at a distribution qγ ∼ N (µˆn, σ2n) with the mean
µˆn = wnXn + (1 − wn)µˆn−1 (with wn = (σ
′
n−1)
2
(σ′x)2+(σ′n−1)2
), and the variance σ2n =(
1
(σ′x)2
+ 1
(σ′n−1)2
)−1
; see (MacKay, 2003) for the exact derivation. Assuming σ2n−1 =
σ2x, then wn = γ. Moreover, we can evaluate the confidence-corrected surprise to be
Scc(Xn; pin−1) = DKL[N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1)||N (Xn, σ2x)] =
(Xn − µˆn−1)2
2σ2x
. (32)
Note that in Eq (32), we used the following equality in Eq (33) (assuming σ2x =
σ2n−1),
DKL[N (a1, b21)||N (a2, b22)] =
(a1 − a2)2
2b22
+
1
2
(
b21
b22
− 1− ln b
2
1
b22
)
. (33)
4.11 The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by a Dirichlet distribu-
tion
Assume that the current belief about the probability of transition from state s ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}
to all D − 1 possible next states sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}\s is described by a Dirichlet distri-
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bution pin(θs) ∝ Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)α(s,sˇ)−1 parametrized by αs = α(s, :). Here, θs = θ(s, :)
denotes a vector of random variable θ(s, sˇ) that determines the probability of transition
from s to sˇ, i.e., 0 ≤ θ(s, sˇ) ≤ 1 and∑sˇ θ(s, sˇ) = 1. The likelihood function for an oc-
curred transition X : s → s′ is p(X|θs) = θ(s, s′) = Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)[sˇ=s′], where [.] denotes
the Iverson bracket (that is equal to 1 if the condition inside the bracket is correct and 0
otherwise). Therefore, the updated belief qγ(θs) obtained by the SMiLe rule [Eq (6)],
qγ(θs) ∝
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
[sˇ=s′]
)γ
.
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
α(s,sˇ)−1)1−γ ∝ Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)β(s,sˇ)−1, (34)
is again a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by β(s, sˇ) = (1− γ)α(s, sˇ) + γ(1 + [sˇ =
s′]).
The probability Tˆ [t](s, s′) of transition from s to s′ at time step t is estimated by
Tˆ [t](s, s′) = α[t](s,s
′)−1+∑
sˇ(α[t](s,sˇ)−1+) , where α[t](s, sˇ) denotes the updated model parameter at
time step t. Here,  > 0 is a very small number which prevents the denominator from
being zero.
4.12 The online EM algorithm for the maze-exploration task
The online EM algorithm, presented in (Mongillo and Deneve, 2008), is an estima-
tion algorithm for the unknown parameters of a hidden Markov model (HMM). For
the maze-exploration task we adapted the method presented in (Mongillo and Deneve,
2008) such that the transition probability to a new room also depends on the previously
visited room (and not just the current environment). The HMM of the maze-exploration
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task consists of two sets of unknown parameters: (i) a set P = [Pij]2×2 of (unknown)
switch probabilities from environment i to j (where we use 1 for environment A and
2 for environment B), and (ii) a set T = [Tjss′ ]2×16×16 of state transition probabilities,
where Tjss′ denotes the probability of transition from state s to state s′ within environ-
ment j. The set of all unknown parameters is denoted by θ ≡ (P,T).
At each time step t, we estimate the probability qtl = P (Et = l|s0→t) of being in
environment Et = l ∈ {1, 2}, given all previous state transitions s0→t = {s0, s1, ..., st}.
The probability qtl can be recursively calculated by
qˆtl =
∑
m
qˆt−1m γ
t
ml, (35)
where γtml =
P (s′=st|s=st−1,Et=l)P (Et=l|Et−1=m)
P (s′=st|s0→(t−1)) belongs to a set of auxiliary variables
Γ = [γlh]2×2 that are calculated by the last estimate θˆt−1 of the model parameters:
γtlh =
Pˆ t−1lh Tˆ
t−1
hst−1st∑
m,n qˆ
t−1
m Pˆ
t−1
mn Tˆ
t−1
nst−1st
. (36)
Then, using these auxiliary variables γlh, a set Φ = [φˆi,j,s,s′,h]2×2×16×16×2 of param-
eters is recursively updated:
φˆti,j,s,s′,h =
∑
l
γtlh
[
(1− η)φˆt−1i,j,s,s′,l + ηqˆt−1l ∆lhst−1stijss′
]
, (37)
where ∆lhst−1stijss′ = δ(i− l)δ(j−h)δ(s−st−1)δ(s′−st), δ(.) is the Kronecker delta (i.e.,
1 when its argument is zero and 0 otherwise), and η is the learning rate.
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Finally, the model parameters are updated by
Pˆ tij =
∑
s,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h∑
j,s,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h
; Tˆ tjss′ =
∑
i,h φˆ
t
ijss′h∑
i,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h
. (38)
We emphasize that in order for the online EM algorithm to work properly, some
technical considerations must be respected. For instance, in the beginning of learning,
only online estimation of Φ must be updated (without updating the model parameters
θ), so that the estimation error for the first 2000 time steps of our simulation (Fig 7A,
blue) remains fixed. Moreover, we found that the online EM algorithm works well
only if it is correctly initialized. To make our comparison fair, we assumed the agent
“believes in” frequent transitions between environments by initializing the probabilities
Pˆ 0ij that describe the switch between environment A and B to be very close to true
ones. Without such an assumption, the online EM takes even more time than what we
reported here to learn the maze-exploration task. The actual initialization values were
Pˆ 012 = Pˆ
0
21 = 0.1 while the true values were P12 = P21 = 0.005.
Acknowledgments
This project has been funded by the European Research Council under grant agree-
ment No. 268689, and by the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation
program under grant agreement No. 720270.
57
References
Adams, R. P. and MacKay, D. J. (2007). Bayesian online changepoint detection. arXiv
preprint arXiv:0710.3742
Aston-Jones, G. and Cohen, J. D. (2005). An integrative theory of locus coeruleus-
norepinephrine function: adaptive gain and optimal performance. Annu. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 28, 403–450
Aston-Jones, G., Rajkowski, J., and Kubiak, P. (1997). Conditioned responses of mon-
key locus coeruleus neurons anticipate acquisition of discriminative behavior in a
vigilance task. Neuroscience 80, 697–715
Baldi, P. and Itti, L. (2010). Of bits and wows: a bayesian theory of surprise with
applications to attention. Neural Networks 23, 649–666
Balleine, B. W. and Dickinson, A. (1998). Goal-directed instrumental action: contin-
gency and incentive learning and their cortical substrates. Neuropharmacology 37,
407–419
Balleine, B. W. and O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies in action
control: corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. Neuropsy-
chopharmacology 35, 48–69
Bear, M. F. and Singer, W. (1986). Modulation of visual cortical plasticity by acetyl-
choline and noradrenaline. Nature 320, 172–176
Beck, J. M., Ma, W. J., Kiani, R., Hanks, T., Churchland, A. K., Roitman, J., et al.
58
(2008). Probabilistic population codes for bayesian decision making. Neuron 60,
1142–1152
Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., and Rushworth, M. F. (2007). Learning
the value of information in an uncertain world. Nature neuroscience 10, 1214–1221
Bishop, C. M. (1994). Novelty detection and neural network validation. In Vision,
Image and Signal Processing, IEE Proceedings- (IET), vol. 141, 217–222
Bouret, S. and Sara, S. J. (2004). Reward expectation, orientation of attention and
locus coeruleus-medial frontal cortex interplay during learning. European Journal of
Neuroscience 20, 791–802
Bouret, S. and Sara, S. J. (2005). Network reset: a simplified overarching theory of
locus coeruleus noradrenaline function. Trends in neurosciences 28, 574–582
Brea, J., Senn, W., and Pfister, J.-P. (2013). Matching recall and storage in sequence
learning with spiking neural networks. The Journal of Neuroscience 33, 9565–9575
Clayton, E. C., Rajkowski, J., Cohen, J. D., and Aston-Jones, G. (2004). Phasic activa-
tion of monkey locus ceruleus neurons by simple decisions in a forced-choice task.
The Journal of neuroscience 24, 9914–9920
Cohen, J. D., McClure, S. M., and Angela, J. Y. (2007). Should i stay or should i go?
how the human brain manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences
362, 933–942
59
Costa, V. D. and Rudebeck, P. H. (2016). More than meets the eye: the relationship
between pupil size and locus coeruleus activity. Neuron 89, 8–10
Dayan, P., Kakade, S., and Montague, P. R. (2000). Learning and selective attention.
nature neuroscience 3, 1218–1223
Donchin, E., Ritter, W., McCallum, W., et al. (1978). Cognitive psychophysiology: The
endogenous components of the erp. Event-related brain potentials in man , 349–411
Fairhall, A. L., Lewen, G. D., Bialek, W., and van Steveninck, R. R. d. R. (2001).
Efficiency and ambiguity in an adaptive neural code. Nature 412, 787–792
Frank, M., Leitner, J., Stollenga, M., Fo¨rster, A., and Schmidhuber, J. (2013). Curios-
ity driven reinforcement learning for motion planning on humanoids. Frontiers in
neurorobotics 7
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews
Neuroscience 11, 127–138
Friston, K. and Kiebel, S. (2009). Predictive coding under the free-energy principle.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences
364, 1211–1221
Gershman, S. J. and Niv, Y. (2015). Novelty and inductive generalization in human
reinforcement learning. Topics in cognitive science 7, 391–415
Gil, Z., Connors, B. W., and Amitai, Y. (1997). Differential regulation of neocortical
synapses by neuromodulators and activity. Neuron 19, 679–686
60
Gillner, S. and Mallot, H. A. (1998). Navigation and acquisition of spatial knowledge
in a virtual maze. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 10, 445–463
Gu, Q. (2002). Neuromodulatory transmitter systems in the cortex and their role in
cortical plasticity. Neuroscience 111, 815–835
Hasselmo, M. E. (1999). Neuromodulation: acetylcholine and memory consolidation.
Trends in cognitive sciences 3, 351–359
Hasselmo, M. E., Wyble, B. P., and Wallenstein, G. V. (1996). Encoding and retrieval of
episodic memories: role of cholinergic and gabaergic modulation in the hippocam-
pus. Hippocampus 6, 693–708
Hayden, B. Y., Heilbronner, S. R., Pearson, J. M., and Platt, M. L. (2011). Surprise
signals in anterior cingulate cortex: neuronal encoding of unsigned reward prediction
errors driving adjustment in behavior. The Journal of Neuroscience 31, 4178–4187
Hess, E. H. and Polt, J. M. (1960). Pupil size as related to interest value of visual
stimuli. Science 132, 349–350
Holland, P. C. (1997). Brain mechanisms for changes in processing of conditioned
stimuli in pavlovian conditioning: Implications for behavior theory. Animal Learning
& Behavior 25, 373–399
Hsieh, C. Y., Cruikshank, S. J., and Metherate, R. (2000). Differential modulation of au-
ditory thalamocortical and intracortical synaptic transmission by cholinergic agonist.
Brain research 880, 51–64
61
Hurley, M. M., Dennett, D. C., and Adams, R. B. (2011). Inside jokes: Using humor to
reverse-engineer the mind (MIT press)
Itti, L. and Baldi, P. (2009). Bayesian surprise attracts human attention. Vision research
49, 1295–1306
Itti, L. and Baldi, P. F. (2005). Bayesian surprise attracts human attention. In Advances
in neural information processing systems. 547–554
Jaskowski, P., Wauschkuhn, B., et al. (1994). Suspense and surprise: On the relationship
between expectancies and p3. Psychophysiology 31, 359–369
Jepma, M. and Nieuwenhuis, S. (2011). Pupil diameter predicts changes in the
exploration–exploitation trade-off: evidence for the adaptive gain theory. Journal
of cognitive neuroscience 23, 1587–1596
Jones, D. and Higgins, G. (1995). Effect of scopolamine on visual attention in rats.
Psychopharmacology 120, 142–149
Kakade, S. and Dayan, P. (2002). Acquisition and extinction in autoshaping. Psycho-
logical review 109, 533
Kalat, J. (2012). Biological psychology (Cengage Learning)
Kimura, F., Fukuda, M., and Tsumoto, T. (1999). Acetylcholine suppresses the spread
of excitation in the visual cortex revealed by optical recording: possible differential
effect depending on the source of input. European Journal of Neuroscience 11, 3597–
3609
62
Knight, R. T. et al. (1996). Contribution of human hippocampal region to novelty de-
tection. Nature 383, 256–259
Kobayashi, M., Imamura, K., Sugai, T., Onoda, N., Yamamoto, M., Komai, S., et al.
(2000). Selective suppression of horizontal propagation in rat visual cortex by nore-
pinephrine. European Journal of Neuroscience 12, 264–272
Kolossa, A., Kopp, B., and Fingscheidt, T. (2015). A computational analysis of the
neural bases of bayesian inference. NeuroImage 106, 222–237
Krugel, L. K., Biele, G., Mohr, P. N., Li, S.-C., and Heekeren, H. R. (2009). Genetic
variation in dopaminergic neuromodulation influences the ability to rapidly and flex-
ibly adapt decisions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, 17951–
17956
Little, D. Y. and Sommer, F. T. (2014). Learning and exploration in action-perception
loops. Closing the Loop Around Neural Systems , 295
Ma, W. J., Beck, J. M., Latham, P. E., and Pouget, A. (2006). Bayesian inference with
probabilistic population codes. Nature neuroscience 9, 1432–1438
MacKay, D. J. (2003). Information theory, inference and learning algorithms (Cam-
bridge university press)
Missonnier, P., Ragot, R., Derouesne´, C., Guez, D., and Renault, B. (1999). Automatic
attentional shifts induced by a noradrenergic drug in alzheimers disease: evidence
from evoked potentials. International journal of psychophysiology 33, 243–251
63
Mohamed, S. and Rezende, D. J. (2015). Variational information maximisation for
intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning. In Advances in neural information
processing systems. 2125–2133
Mongillo, G. and Deneve, S. (2008). Online learning with hidden markov models.
Neural computation 20, 1706–1716
Morris, R. (1984). Developments of a water-maze procedure for studying spatial learn-
ing in the rat. Journal of neuroscience methods 11, 47–60
Nassar, M. R., Rumsey, K. M., Wilson, R. C., Parikh, K., Heasly, B., and Gold, J. I.
(2012). Rational regulation of learning dynamics by pupil-linked arousal systems.
Nature neuroscience 15, 1040–1046
Nassar, M. R., Wilson, R. C., Heasly, B., and Gold, J. I. (2010). An approximately
bayesian delta-rule model explains the dynamics of belief updating in a changing
environment. The Journal of Neuroscience 30, 12366–12378
Nelson, A. L., Grant, E., Galeotti, J. M., and Rhody, S. (2004). Maze exploration
behaviors using an integrated evolutionary robotics environment. Robotics and Au-
tonomous Systems 46, 159–173
Oudeyer, P.-Y., Kaplan, F., and Hafner, V. V. (2007). Intrinsic motivation systems for
autonomous mental development. IEEE transactions on evolutionary computation
11, 265–286
Palm, G. (2012). Novelty, information and surprise (Springer)
64
Payzan-LeNestour, E. and Bossaerts, P. (2011). Risk, unexpected uncertainty, and es-
timation uncertainty: Bayesian learning in unstable settings. PLoS computational
biology 7, e1001048
Pearce, J. M. and Hall, G. (1980). A model for pavlovian learning: variations in the
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological review
87, 532
Pineda, J., Westerfield, M., Kronenberg, B., and Kubrin, J. (1997). Human and mon-
key p3-like responses in a mixed modality paradigm: effects of context and context-
dependent noradrenergic influences. International Journal of Psychophysiology 27,
223–240
Preuschoff, K. and Bossaerts, P. (2007). Adding prediction risk to the theory of reward
learning. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1104, 135–146
Preuschoff, K., Quartz, S. R., and Bossaerts, P. (2008). Human insula activation reflects
risk prediction errors as well as risk. The Journal of Neuroscience 28, 2745–2752
Preuschoff, K., t Hart, B. M., and Einha¨user, W. (2011). Pupil dilation signals surprise:
evidence for noradrenalines role in decision making. Front Neurosci 5, 115
Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., and Aston-Jones, G. (1994). Locus coeruleus activity in mon-
key: phasic and tonic changes are associated with altered vigilance. Brain research
bulletin 35, 607–616
Ranganath, C. and Rainer, G. (2003). Neural mechanisms for detecting and remember-
ing novel events. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4, 193–202
65
Redgrave, P., Rodriguez, M., Smith, Y., Rodriguez-Oroz, M. C., Lehericy, S., Bergman,
H., et al. (2010). Goal-directed and habitual control in the basal ganglia: implications
for parkinson’s disease. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 760–772
Rezende, D. J. and Gerstner, W. (2014). Stochastic variational learning in recurrent
spiking networks. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 8. doi:10.3389/fncom.
2014.00038
Roesch, M. R., Esber, G. R., Li, J., Daw, N. D., and Schoenbaum, G. (2012). Sur-
prise! neural correlates of pearce–hall and rescorla–wagner coexist within the brain.
European Journal of Neuroscience 35, 1190–1200
Ru¨ter, J., Marcille, N., Sprekeler, H., Gerstner, W., and Herzog, M. H. (2012). Paradox-
ical evidence integration in rapid decision processes. PLoS Comput Biol 8, e1002382
Sara, S. and Segal, M. (1991). Plasticity of sensory responses of locus coeruleus neu-
rons in the behaving rat: implications for cognition. Progress in brain research 88,
571–585
Sara, S. J. (1998). Learning by neurones: role of attention, reinforcement and behaviour.
Comptes Rendus de l’Acade´mie des Sciences-Series III-Sciences de la Vie 321, 193–
198
Sara, S. J. (2009). The locus coeruleus and noradrenergic modulation of cognition.
Nature reviews neuroscience 10, 211–223
Sara, S. J., Vankov, A., and Herve´, A. (1994). Locus coeruleus-evoked responses in
66
behaving rats: a clue to the role of noradrenaline in memory. Brain research bulletin
35, 457–465
Schmidhuber, J. (2010). Formal theory of creativity, fun, and intrinsic motivation
(1990–2010). IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development 2, 230–247
Scho¨lkopf, B. and Smola, A. J. (2002). Learning with kernels: Support vector ma-
chines, regularization, optimization, and beyond (MIT press)
Schultz, W. (2015). Neuronal reward and decision signals: from theories to data. Phys-
iological reviews 95, 853–951
Schultz, W. (2016). Dopamine reward prediction-error signalling: a two-component
response. Nature Reviews Neuroscience
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Techni-
cal Journal 27, 379–423. doi:10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x
Silver, D., van Hasselt, H., Hessel, M., Schaul, T., Guez, A., Harley, T., et al. (2016).
The predictron: End-to-end learning and planning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.08810
Singh, S. P., Barto, A. G., and Chentanez, N. (2004). Intrinsically motivated reinforce-
ment learning. In NIPS. vol. 17, 1281–1288
Sun, Y., Gomez, F., and Schmidhuber, J. (2011). Planning to be surprised: Optimal
bayesian exploration in dynamic environments. In Artificial General Intelligence
(Springer). 41–51
Sutton, R. S., Modayil, J., Delp, M., Degris, T., Pilarski, P. M., White, A., et al.
67
(2011). Horde: A scalable real-time architecture for learning knowledge from un-
supervised sensorimotor interaction. In The 10th International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2 (International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems), 761–768
Tenenbaum, J. B. and Griffiths, T. L. (2001). Structure learning in human causal induc-
tion. Advances in neural information processing systems , 59–65
Tishby, N., Pereira, F. C., and Bialek, W. (2000). The information bottleneck method.
arXiv preprint physics/0004057
Tribus, M. (1961). Information theory as the basis for thermostatics and thermodynam-
ics. Journal of Applied Mechanics 28, 1–8
Vankov, A., Herve´-Minvielle, A., and Sara, S. J. (1995). Response to novelty and its
rapid habituation in locus coeruleus neurons of the freely exploring rat. European
Journal of Neuroscience 7, 1180–1187
Wallenstein, G. V., Hasselmo, M. E., and Eichenbaum, H. (1998). The hippocampus as
an associator of discontiguous events. Trends in neurosciences 21, 317–323
Wilson, P. N., Boumphrey, P., and Pearce, J. M. (1992). Restoration of the orienting
response to a light by a change in its predictive accuracy. Quarterly Journal of Ex-
perimental Psychology: Section B 44, 17–36
Wilson, R. C., Nassar, M. R., and Gold, J. I. (2013). A mixture of delta-rules approxi-
mation to bayesian inference in change-point problems. PLoS computational biology
9, e1003150
68
Yu, A. J. and Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty, neuromodulation, and attention. Neuron
46, 681–692
69
